Local 483 Safety Report

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Transmission/Storage Safety

   

No full names will be used anywhere in this report without permission.   

NEAR MISS/CLOSE CALL

Employee Name:

XXXXXXXXXXXX

Employee Number:

  

Phone:

 XXXXXXXXXXXX

Occupation:

Department:

Date Of Near Miss/Close Call: 01/12/2007

 

Describe Near Miss/Close Call

During hot tie-in operations a rush of gas caused controlled fire to become larger than could be controlled by fire control stack. Excavation needed to be evacuated while fire extinguishers were deployed to put out fire. Job was shut-down and secured while the cause of the gas rush was investigated. Various items were looked at as cause, such as improper fire control stack operation and malfunction of fire control stack. It was determined that a valve greasing operation approx. 110 ft  away caused the seat on plug valve to be hydraulically lifted creating a path for gas to leak through from the upstream side. After cause was determined an all hands safety meeting was conducted. Discussed what happened, how everyone performed, and what could be done in the future to prevent re-occurrence and to more safely execute evacuation. Also discussed was how to proceed with the tie-in operations. We proceeded by discontinuing the valve greasing operation, cleaning the excavation of ansul extinguisher material and ensuring that we had charged fire extinguishers. Then relit the tie-in location and ensured we could control the fire. Also we ran controlled fire operations for 30 minutes prior to allowing personnel to continue welding to ensure and give us confidence we had fire control and would not get another surge of gas. Rest of tie-in operations went smoothly.

Contributing Factors of Near Miss/Close Call

Greasing a closed block valve that is isolating tie-in could allow gas leakage through valve.

Corrective Action

Prohibit greasing of closed block valves that are being used for isolation. Add warning to tie-in procedures. Discuss the evacuation procedure for excavation during morning safety meeting. Emphasize the diligence of fire watch duties. Review with all work groups.

 

 

 

 

Follow up to near miss at Quigley Station from Robin Downs

5/17/06

Hi Robin,

Listed below are responses to questions from your April 13th., e-mail regarding the incident involving the broken sling and the receiver filter separator at the Quigley Station Facility. 

1.  Why did the operator not know the weight of the vessel?

The Southwest Contractor foremen on the job site, used a brand new 48,000 lbs., nylon sling to pick up the filter separator unit, assuming that it would be strong enough to lift the weight of the filter separator.  The Contract foreman didn't take the time to look at the filter separator to verify its specific weight and select the proper rated lifting sling.  Note: On both sides of the filter separator the weight is clearly written with white marker 51,000 lbs.  

2.  How can you use a boom to pick something up not knowing the weight of the object that's being picked up?

This is a common error that historically has been one of the leading factors to mistakes occurring, through human error and making assumptions.

3. Did the company inspector at the job site know the weight to the vessel?  If so why wasn't the operator informed? If not Why not?

Yes, the company inspector was aware of the weight of the filter separator.  With the weight clearly marked on both sides of the vessel, and the fact that the Contractor had previously moved the filter separator it was assumed that the Contractors were aware of the weight of the separator.
 

4. How did the vessel get to the job site?  Did whoever deliver it to Quigley know the weight?

The separator unit was delivered to Quigley Station by Southwest Contractors on a flat bed trailer, the trailer carrying the separator was backed into the station through the front gate, where it was to be off loaded by a side boom.

Yes, the Contractor that initially loaded and delivered the separator unit knew its weight.

 

 

Brea Near Miss Report

5/9/06

 

CLICK HERE to see the Brea Near Miss Report for tie-in safety issues.  Provided by Transmission Safety Officer, Robin Downs.

 

Goleta Near Miss Update

5/9/06

 

The compressor that  backfired at Goleta and damaged the compressor building and destroyed parts of the exhaust system has been repaired.  That is, .........  the damaged parts have been replaced.  Last week local management told us that they were going to put the unit back into service and that they could NOT guarantee it wouldn't self destruct again.  Of course, that was not acceptable to the union.  I wrote a letter to the local manager and reminded him of his personal liability for knowingly putting employees into harm's way - by not taking every available option to insure that the cause of the backfires was eliminated.  I sent copies of this letter to the VP's and Director for Storage, plus Labor Relations.  To their credit, they have taken our advice and have hired a professional programmer (with an engine/compressor specialty) to find out why the computer control program for this engine allows dangerous backfire situations.  This was a case where safety would have taken a back seat to Gas Control and local managers who don't want to look bad by having equipment out of service - if the union hadn't intervened.

Another Goleta Near Miss  4/7/06

A contractor on a backhoe ripped a 220 volt electrical line out of the ground at Goleta's Miller Site - which houses 8 gas wells.  Nobody was hurt and power was restored by the end of the day.   I'm not aware of any investigation into this accident.  Dennis Zukowski

Brea Near Misses  4/6/06

The following near miss report was done without benefit of union officer participation.  Pipeline Safety Officer, Robin Downs is going to meet with Safety Staff and Brea management to discuss this situation on Friday. 

NEAR MISS/CLOSE CALL
Employee Name: Brea Tie-in on Line 1018 Employee Number:    Phone:   - -
Occupation: Department: Transmission
Date Of Near Miss/Close Call: 04/04/2006  
Describe Near Miss/Close Call
1. Tie-in piece was not secured by cribing at both ends causing the pipe to shift while contractor was grinding. 2. The side-boom truck pulled an electrical cord that was running into an excavation while moving away from the work site. 3. Electical cord in the excavation was wet causing an electrical shock. 4. By-pass was used for fire control stack at tie-in location #2 which could have over-pressurized tie-in section. 5. Employee slipped on curb because of mud on his boots. 6. Loss of communication between tie-in excavations (900')
Contributing Factors of Near Miss/Close Call
1. Pipe was not secured at both ends before work began. 2. Employee failed to do the circle of safety before moving side boom. 3. Rain entered the excavation with several electrical cords laying on the bottom. 4. Cold weather caused regulators to freeze on gas pod restricting pressure. 5. Rain caused the location to become muddy where equipment was located. 6. Rain caused problems with cell phones and radios making communication between tie-in locations difficult.
 

Corrective Action
Brea conducts a post job meeting after every tie-in. In that meeting the employees come up with a list of near misses and discussed how we will prevent future occurences. 1. No work will begin on the tie-in piece untill it is sucured in place. 2. Circle of safety will be done before any vehicle is moved. 3.Generators will be placed as close to the excavation as possible and cords kept out of any water. We will verify that GFI's are installed 4. We will have regulator design for fire control stack checked by engineering. 5. In the future we will have plywwood to walk on if the weather conditions could change. 6. In the future work will stop if we are unable to communicate between locations. We have purchased equipment that can be used in all weather conditions.
 

Supervisor:
Supv. Email:
Supv. Phone:

Jon, Yesterday and today I have received numerous phone calls about a tie-in that happened last week in the Brea district. I believe you ( us ) should do some investigating on. I believe that there are numerous near miss here.

 1) Electric cords laying in the mud and water.
 2) Personal being shocked by either the electric cords or welding leads
 3) The ramp into the tie-in hole being mudding and personal slipping going in and out
 4) Welding going on at both sides of tie-in with no separation and fire control fighting each other ( one side feeding while the other side venting

I am very concerned with these issues. I ( WE ) need answers as well as the work force. Will you please look into this and get back to me ASAP.                                                                                                                                      Robin Downs

One Management Reply........

At Brea District our practice is to have a "debriefing" with field employees after any major project, in order to prevent hazardous situations from reoccurring and to implement better working practices on future similar projects.

Are these reports true?  If so, where was supervision when this was happening?  If they are true, what changes have been put into place to prevent reoccurances?  Vague references to "debriefing" about specific reports of safety violations or concerns will not suffice.  Please provide Robin with a report about what happened - if anything - and what corrective actions were taken.  If you need a formal request in writing from me about this, let me know.  Thank you.  Dennis Zukowski 

Valencia Near Miss  4/6/06

Alan, I was just informed of a possible near miss at Quigley Sta. here in Valencia. I was told that while contractors were unloading a vessel up at Quigley the sling holding the vessel snapped causing the vessel to fall causing damage to the vessel. Do you know about this? If so will you please do a near miss report on this. If not will you investigate and get back to me?

                                                                                                                         Transmission  Safety Officer

                                                                                                                                  Robin Downs

Follow up to Valencia Near Miss.................

Alan, I have a copy of the Accident Investigation Report prepared by _ _ _ _   _ _ _? ) on this near miss. There are some questions that need to be answered that have not been.

1) Why did the operator not know the weight of the vessel?
2) How can you use a boom to pick something up not knowing the weight of the object that’s being picked up?
3) Did the company inspector at the job site know the weight of the vessel? If so why wasn't the operator informed? If not Why not?

4) How did the vessel get to the job site? Did whoever deliver it to Quigley know the weight?

Goleta Near Miss

On Saturday, April 1st Goleta's engine/compressor Main Unit # 9 backfired and the explosion was reportedly heard a mile away.  It shattered 5 windows in the compressor building and destroyed part of the muffler.  It looks as though it might have caused some structural damage to compressor building metal beams.  Fortunately, no one was hurt.  The employee was working alone at the time due to "one person crews".  This is the 4th - and worst - backfire on this engine in the last 2 years.  In the union's opinion only bandaids have been applied to this problem.  As a result, we have filed a safety related grievance on management's failure to adequately adress this safety issue.

Aliso Safety Concern, submitted by employee  3/22/06

4 weeks ago, a Torch crew was setup @FF-32 site with a portable locker room just 10 feet from a well.  An extension cord was run from the locker room through a window without a screen  (The weather was dry but rain was in the forecast that afternoon).   The extension cord insulation was broken completely and all three wires were visible with hard 90 degree bend in the cord where it was also contacting the ground.  There was no GFCI protection installed. 

The safety violation was brought to the immediate attention of "Larry".  We think he is one of the company's drilling staff under Mike and Leigh.  The cord was taken down promptly.

The engineering and drilling department employees do not seem to have training or awareness of the Gas Company and OSHA requirement for GFCI protection on every extension cord.   This was brought up in a February safety meeting with no interest from local authorities.  Why aren't the drilling and engineering people forced to attend our safety meeting to account for this?

In response to this, these are questions the union would like answered:

The union officers of the Storage Safety Committee will follow up on this concern with management and report back to the members.

Aliso Safety Concern, submitted by employee 3/22/06

In late January,while checking the unibolt flange on the well head of FF-32 I discovered that 2 retaining nuts were "hand tight" and nobody knew anything about it.  I brought it to the attention of "Larry" and "Dale" for corrective work. 

In general,  many work over rigs have left improperly installed and under torqued wellhead and lateral fasteners in place at FF-32 when work is completed,  Our engineering group never performs any random inspections of work.  This was also true of all wells at the FF-38 site.  I am quite sure that a safety audit will bear out what I have to say.  If you just look at stud installation and electrical cords, you have the evidence before you.

We have no union personal who are properly DOT and Gas Company trained, inspecting and certifying the work of drilling contractors on our lease.  We have nothing in place for union safety audits and follow up. 

In response to this, these are questions the union would like answered:

The union officers of the Storage Safety Committee will follow up on this concern with management and report back to the members.

Goleta Near Miss

Below is an example of the kind of things we intend to report as a learning tool for employees everywhere.  This was a real life near miss at Goleta a few months ago.

Goleta's main unit engine #9 blew the doors off a compressor and it was only luck that had two employees on the opposite side of the compressor when the explosion occurred.  The resulting blast filled the  compressor building with gas and an operator unknowingly entered the compressor building - putting himself into danger - to see what the alarm condition was for #9.  When the gas detection system in the compressor building went into alarm, Goleta Station was ESD'd - stopping the compressors in the engine room - and blowing down the station.

 
The near miss investigation revealed that the cause of the blast was the installation of a  compressor valve that was been rebuilt and assembled incorrectly by a vendor - the valve would not discharge gas from the compressor and thus allowed compressor pressures to reach explosive levels.
 
As a result of this accident, procedures for checking purchased compressor valves were put into place and rules about entering buildings with explosive levels of gas were reviewed with employees